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Introduction
In the traditional benchmark model of auctions we have the following scenario. There is one indivisible object up for sale and there are n potential bidders. Each bidder's valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object), v i , is private information. In terms of demand function the valuation, v i , can be interpreted in the following way. Let p be the price of the indivisible object.
Then, the demand for the indivisible object, D (p) is as follows.
Bidder i knows his (her) own valuation but does not know others' valuations. He (she) only knows that ∀j 6 = i, V j lies in the interval [v, v] with a known distribution function 1 . Seller also does not know any bidder's valuation. He only knows that for all i, V i lies in the interval [v, v] with a known distribution function. In a standard auction the object is sold to the highest bidder. The payment by each bidder depends on the type of auction used by the seller. There is a huge literature around this model 2 . One of the most celebrated results is the revenue equivalence theorem which states that under certain assumptions (private values, independent types, symmetry, risk neutrality and no budget constraint), the expected revenue to the seller is same across a large class of auctions.
It may be noted that the independent private value model is based on quasilinear utility functions with high enough incomes. In such a case, the demand for the indivisible good and consequently, its valuation is independent of income. As a result, private information about valuations tantamounts to private information about utility functions 3 .
In this paper we consider a more general class of utility functions. We consider a two good world 4 where an individual i has utility function u (x, y), where x ∈ [0, ∞) and y ∈ {0, 1}. The individual's income is m i . This m i may be thought of as the total amount of resources (or wealth) available to individual i. Under standard assumptions we derive valuation, v (m i ), for good y as a function of his income. This links the budget constraint with valuation. We show that bidder's valuation can never exceed his income. We also show that depending on the nature of the utility 1 As per convention, we use capital letters to denote random variables and corresponding small letters to denote the realised values of such variables. 2 See Krishna (2010) for all the standard results around the benchmark model. 3 It does not matter whether incomes are private information or not, as long as they are high enough. 4 An example would be where x is food and y is a piece of painting. 1 function and the income level, the valuation can be strictly increasing, constant or even strictly decreasing in income.
We look at the auction problem from a different angle. We assume that all individuals have the same utility function but have different incomes. We treat incomes as types. Each individual's income is private information and this implies that valuations (that are functions of income) are also private information. To the best of our knowledge, no paper till date has taken this approach.
Then we consider the following problem. Suppose good x is available in a store at a fixed price 1. One unit of the indivisible good y is sold at an auction house. The price of good y and the winner will be determined in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction game. Any individual has the option of not participating in the auction. If he does not participate in the auction for good y, he spends his entire income on good x and earns utility u (m i , 0). Consequently, in any equilibrium the expected payoff to the individual will be at least u (m i , 0). In no circumstances can a bidder with income m i pay more than m i for any good. If a bidder i were to bid more than m i (in the auction for good y) and default, then a penalty would be imposed 5 . In such a framework we analyse first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions 6 .
In a second price auction we first show that for any given utility function, choosing a bid equal to valuation is a weakly dominant strategy for any bidder i with income m i (proposition 1). This shows that the original Vickrey (1961) result is very robust to changes in the benchmark model.
Unlike the second price auction, we do not have a equilibrium existence result for first-price and all-pay auctions for all possible income levels. As such, to analyse such auctions we need to classify incomes into two categories. In our model we will define a critical level of income k where k is such that m i ≤ k ⇔ u (0, 1) ≥ u (m i , 0). If all incomes are below k we say that incomes are low enough and if all incomes are above k we say that incomes are high enough.
We first analyse risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes. We derive the symmetric equilibrium in all the three auctions without any reserve price and show that revenue equivalence fails to hold. More specifically, we show that the expected revenue is same with first price and second price auctions. However, all-pay auction fetches strictly higher expected revenue than first price auction (proposition 2). We try to explain this result by comparing the equilibria in our model with the corresponding equilibria in the symmetric benchmark model. Thereafter, we introduce 5 Che and Gale (1998) has a similar approach. 6 As usual, one can show that first-price auction is outcome equivalent to Dutch auction and second-price auction is outcome equivalent to English auction.
2 reserve price and show that under mild restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is zero (or no reserve price is optimal) for all the three auctions (proposition 4). This stands in contrast to the benchmark model where the revenue maximising reserve price is typically positive and higher than the minimum possible valuation. Moreover, among the three auctions analysed, the expected revenue to the seller is highest in the all-pay auction with zero reserve price. Whether this is an optimal mechanism or not remains an open question.
We next analyse bidders with low enough incomes. With no reserve price and under some restrictions, we show that bidding ones own valuation is a symmetric equilibrium even for firstprice and all-pay auctions (propositions 5-6). The fact that bidding ones' own valuation can be an equilibrium even in all-pay auctions is surprising and counterintuitive. We also show that in this case the expected revenue is the highest with all-pay auctions and lowest with second price auctions (proposition 7). We illustrate our results with specific numerical examples.
Related Literature
It may be noted that we show for all cases v i = v (m i ) ≤ m i . While this seems obvious given the nature of our problem, it is important in the context of the literature. We draw attention to an interesting and influential paper by Che and Gale (1998) which drops the assumption of no budget constraint. A simplified version of their model is as follows. As before let V i = bidder i ' s valuation.
But now, in addition, each bidder is subject to an absolute budget of W i which can be strictly less than V i . This situation may be possible in a more dynamic context in which a bidder is currently financially constrained, but would like to buy if he could borrow. For example, if bidders are firms they may face borrowing constraints. In no circumstances can a bidder with a value-budget pair (v i , w i ) pay more than w i . If a bidder i were to bid more than w i and default, then a penalty would be imposed. Each bider's value-budget pair (V i , W i ) is identically and independently distributed
. An important result of Che and Gale (1998) is that under certain conditions the expected revenue in the first price auction is higher than the expected revenue in the second price auction. It may be noted that in our set-up valuations are always less than or equal to income and consequently, we avoid analysing the type of issues dealt with by Che and Gale (1998).
Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) and Sakai (2008) analyse second price auctions on general preference domains (that include non-quasilinear preferences) and show such auctions satisfy efficiency and strategy-proofness. We approach the problem differently and consider a case where preferences are common knowledge but budgets are private information. Proposition 1, where we show that choosing a bid equal to valuation is a weakly dominant strategy, is similar to the results derived in Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) and Sakai (2008) .
In a very recent paper Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010) analyse auctions with asymmetric bidders in the standard benchmark model and provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal reserve price is zero (or no reserve price is optimal). We have a similar result (proposition 4) and we show that our sufficient conditions are weaker (see the discussion after proposition 4).
Plan of the paper In section 2 we provide the model of our exercise and all the relevant notations.
Section 3 provides the equilibrium in second-price auctions. In section 4 we analyse risk-neutral bidders with high enough incomes. Section 5 analyses equilibrium when incomes are low enough.
Lastly, the appendix gives the proofs of all the results.
The Model
We consider a two good world where an individual i has utility function u (x, y) where x ∈ [0, ∞) and y ∈ {0, 1}. This means that any non-negative amount of good x can be consumed but in case of good y there are only two choices. Either one unit of good y can be consumed or it cannot be consumed. Individual i's income is m i .
We provide the first set of assumptions. These assumptions impose some standard restrictions on the utility function.
Assumption A1. u (0, 0) = 0 and for all y ∈ {0, 1} , u (x, y) is continuous in x for all x ∈ [0, ∞) and partially differentiable w.r.t. x for all x ∈ (0, ∞).
Assumption A2. u (x, y) is strictly increasing in both x and y. That is, u (x, 1) > u (x, 0) for all
Note that assumptions A1-A3 imply that
The sign of u (m i , 0) − u (0, 1) is not known. Since u (x, y) is continuous and strictly increasing 4 in x and since lim x→∞ u (x, 0) > u (0, 1) (see assumption A3) there exists a unique k > 0 s.t.
Let price of x, P x = 1 and price of y be p. Hence the individual's problem is
There are two possible cases. (i) m i ≤ k and (ii) m i > k.
We will now derive the valuation for good y (the maximum price that the consumer is willing to pay for y) for each of these two cases.
Valuation for good y
It may be noted that if p ≤ m i and the individual purchases 7 y he can spend m i − p on x and get u (m i − p, 1). If he does not purchase y and spends his entire income on x he gets u (m i , 0).
Therefore the individual will buy good y (that is choose y = 1)
Hence, for this case the maximum price he is willing to pay for good y (his valuation for y) is v i = m i . 7 If p > mi then the individual cannot purchase y and he has to spend the entire income on good x and get u (mi, 0). 
That is, the maximum price he is willing to pay for good y (his valuation for y) is
Therefore we get that valuations are functions of income.
In terms of demand function we can write that for an individual with income m i the demand for good y is the following.
increasing in income. When m i ∈ (k, ∞) (income is high enough) we claim that the valuation,
, may be increasing, constant or even decreasing in income. We now illustrate our claim with some examples.
Example 1: Suppose utility is quasilinear in x. That is, u (x, y) = x +û (y), whereû (1) > u (0) = 0. Here u (0, 1) =û (1) and u (m i , 0) = m i .
6
Note that here k =û (1) and valuation is
Note that here valuation, v (m i ), is constant for all m i > k. In standard auction-theory the above utility function is used and the income is assumed to be high enough (i.e. m i > k). Incomplete information about others' valuation simply means incomplete information aboutû (1). That is, for the standard independent private value model, each bidder knows his valuation (v i =û i (1)) but does not know other bidders' valuations (v j =û j (1) , j 6 = i). It may also be noted that since in the benchmark model it is assumed that for all i, m i > k; it does not matter whether incomes are private information or not (as valuations do not depend on incomes).
Note that here k = 1 and for
Here v (m i ) is strictly increasing in m i for all m i .
Example 3. Let u (x, y) = x 2 + y.
Note that here k = 1. Hence Price of good y will be determined in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction. Note that the consumer is no longer a price-taker. His bid affects the equilibrium price of y. As noted in the introduction, any individual has the option of not participating in the auction. If he does not participate in the auction for good y, he spends his entire income on good x and earns utility u (m i , 0). Consequently, in any equilibrium, the expected payoff to the individual will be at least u (m i , 0). In no circumstances can a bidder with income m i pay more than m i for any good. If a bidder i were to bid more than m i (in the auction for good y) and default, then a penalty, γ (where γ > 0), would be imposed. If he defaults he cannot obtain good y (even if his bid is the highest).
In case the penalty amount exceeds his income, he has to forfeit his income. That is, in case of default, his total payment would be min {γ, m i }. If he participates in the auction and makes a payment P i he spends the remaining amount, m i − P i , on good x.
We now provide our next set of assumptions. Under assumptions A1-A3 and B1-B2 we will analyse three types of auctions viz (i) first-price auction (ii) second price auction and (iii) all-pay auctions.
Let r be the reserve price. In any such auction the set of actions available for any bidder is bid is the highest he has to default and pay min {γ, m i }. Note that he cannot obtain good y if he defaults. Let P w be the probability of win if he chooses bid b i > m i . In this case, his expected payoff
. Note that for any P w ∈ [0, 1] this expected payoff is less than or equal to u (m i , 0) (with strict inequality when P w > 0). This implies that it is always better for him to choose {No} than to choose any bid b i > m i . This means in first price or all-pay auctions no bidder will choose a bid higher than his income. We will later show that for second price auctions choosing a bid
we have v (m i ) ≤ m i , bidders' bids will be below their incomes in second price auctions.
Before giving our main results we need to provide some preliminaries on order statistics.
Order Statistics : some notations and preliminaries
where M (i) s are M i s arranged in decreasing magnitudes, are defined to be the order statistics corresponding to the random sample
We would be interested in M (1) (highest order statistic) and M (2) (second highest order statistic).
The corresponding distribution functions and density functions are F 1 (.), F 2 (.) and f 1 (.), f 2 (.).
Note that
Another useful random variable is T = max {M 2 , M 3 ...M n }. To any individual this is the maximum of the others' incomes. The distribution and density function of T is G (.) and g (.) respectively.
Clearly
We will be using these notations frequently in our proofs. 9
Equilibrium in second price auctions
We first analyse second price auction. The result is identical to the standard result in auction theory.
Proposition 1 If r = 0 then in a second-price auction for any m i ∈ [α, β] it's a weakly dominant strategy for bidder i to bid his own valuation. That is, the following is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the second price auction.
Comment Irrespective of the nature of utility function and the level of incomes, bidding one's own valuation is a weakly dominant strategy in a second price auction. This shows that the original result of Vickrey (1961) on second price auction is very robust to changes in model specifications. As noted in the introduction, Proposition 1 is similar to result derived in Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) and Sakai (2008) that deal with second price auctions on general preference domains (including non-quasilinear preferences) and show such auctions satisfy efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Unlike second price auctions, we do not have a equilibrium existence result for first-price and all-pay auctions for all possible income levels. Consequently, to analyse such auctions we classify incomes into two categories.
High enough and low enough incomes We take k as a critical benchmark of the level of incomes. If β < k (that is, all incomes are below k) then we say that incomes are low enough. If α ≥ k (that is, all incomes are above k) we say that incomes are high enough.
Risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes
We now consider the following class of utility functions where the individual is risk neutral and incomes are high enough. In our framework an individual would be risk neutral iff
For an explanation about why this is so see Kreps (1990, chapter 3) 8 .
It is clear, that, to be consistent with our assumptions, we need a utility function of the following type.
where q ≥ w > 0 and s > 0.
Note that here u (m i , 0) = wm i and u (0, 1) = s. We now explain as to why we need q ≥ w > 0 and Since we do not consider the quasi-linear utility function we will assume that q > w . This means valuations are strictly increasing in incomes for all m i . And let α ≥ k = s w . This implies that all incomes are high enough.
Symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without any reserve price
We now compute the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions without any reserve price when all incomes are high enough.
First price auction
Let b I (m i ), which is strictly increasing in m i be the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
. Then the probability that 1 wins is (whose price is unity). From (2) we get that conditional on winning, his payoff is q
If he does not win the auction he spends his entire income on good x and earns a payoff wm 1 . Hence bidder 1's expected payoff by bidding b I (z) is
Now for b I (m 1 ) to be the equilibrium bid chosen by bidder 1 we need that
That is,
Hence b I (m 1 ) solves the following differential equation (4) and the boundary condition (4a).
To get the exact functional form of b I (m) we proceed as follows. Note that using (3) ).
Since G (α) = 0 we have
From section 2.3 we know that G (.) = F n−1 (.). Hence
Second-price auction
From proposition 1 we know that when α ≥ k = s q the following constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the second price auction. 
Now for b AP (m 1 ) to be the equilibrium bid chosen by bidder 1 we need that
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium b AP (α) = 0. The reason is that any bidder whose income is α wins with probability zero in a symmetric increasing equilibrium. Since it's an all-pay auction he should bid zero and pay zero. Hence b AP (m 1 ) solves the following differential equation (6) and the boundary condition (6a).
To get the exact functional form of b AP (m) we proceed as follows. Note that
Since G (α) = 0 and b AP (α) = 0 we get that
Noting that G (.) = F n−1 (.) from above we get
remark 2 The derivations of b I (.) and b AP (.) are only heuristic because both (1) and (3) 
Expected revenues without any reserve price
The expected revenue in the three auctions (without any reserve price) are as follows.
First-price :
All-pay :
We now provide our next main result which shows that revenue equivalence breaks down even with risk neutrality.
Proposition 2 When bidders are risk neutral and incomes are high enough (i.e.
Comment With risk neutral bidders, the expected revenue is same in first-price and second-price auctions for high enough incomes. Surprisingly however, this does not extend to all-pay auctions.
This stands in stark contrast to the benchmark model where the expected revenue is same for all three auctions analysed here. We now provide a direct comparison of our result with the benchmark model and provide a plausible explanation behind proposition 2.
Note that the lowest possible valuation is v (α) = In a second price auction of the benchmark model a bidder with valuation ρ would bid ρ and the corresponding bidder in our auction (whose income is m) would bid v (m) = ρ. We now show that the bidding behaviour in first price auction is exactly the same in our model and the benchmark model.
Let in equilibrium a bidder with valuation ρ bid B I (ρ) in the benchmark model. We know that 9
This implies
This means that a corresponding bidder whose income is m (where v (m) = ρ) in our model bids exactly the same as he would have under the benchmark model. Since in the benchmark model the expected revenue in first price auction is the same as in second price auction, the same result must go through in our model also.
9 See chapter 2 of Krishna (2010).
However, now we show that in our model a bidder bids higher in all-pay auction as compared to the corresponding bidder in the benchmark model and this implies that the expected revenue with all-pay auction is higher in our model and revenue equivalence breaks down.
In a symmetric equilibrium in all pay auction under the benchmark model a bidder with valuation ρ bids B AP (ρ) where 10
From the derivations before we get
We know that ρ = v (m) and this means
Note that for all m ∈ [α, β) we have
Hence, in our model we
This clearly shows that in an all-pay auction a bidder with income m in our model would bid higher than the corresponding bidder with valuation ρ (where ρ = v (m)) in the benchmark model.
This implies that the expected revenue in all-pay auction would be higher in our model than in the benchmark model. Since in the benchmark model the expected revenue from all-pay auction is the same as in first price or second price auctions, in our model the expected revenue from all-pay auction is higher than either first price or second price auctions.
10 See chapter 3 of Krishna (2010).
We now illustrate proposition 2 with an example. Clearly all-pay auction fetches more revenue and the revenue equivalence breaks down even with risk neutral bidders.
Introducing reserve prices in the risk neutral case
Let the auctioneer impose a reserve price r. This means that bids below r are not acceptable.
As before we take α ≥ k = . It may be noted that without any reserve price we had b I (α) = v (α),
and β AP (α) = 0. Consequently, any reserve price, r, such that 0 < r < v (α) will have no impact on bidding equilibrium in first-price and second price auctions. However, such a r will affect the equilibrium in all-pay auctions. Also note that, if r > v (β) then in any auction the best action for any bidder is to choose {No} (that is, not participate in the auction for good y and spend the entire income on good x). Hence, we restrict our attention to r ∈ [0, v (β)]. We give below the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all the three auctions when the seller imposes a positive reserve price r. The computation of such equilibria are straightforward. 
First-Price auction
If r ∈ [0, v (a)) then for all m ∈ [α, β] b I (m) = 1 q • (q − w) m + s − q − w F n−1 (m) Z m α F n−1 (t) dt¸for all m ∈ [α, β] . If r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] then b I (m) = ⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ {No} if m ∈ h α, qr−s q−w1 q h (q − w) m + s − q−w F n−1 (m) R m qr−s q−w F n−1 (t) dt i if m ∈ h qr−s q−w , β i .
Second-Price auction
If r ∈ [0, v (a)) then for all m ∈ [α, β] b II (m) = 1 q [(q − w) m + s] for all m ∈ [α, β] . If r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] then b II (m) = ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ {No} if m ∈ h α,
All-pay auction
Let r ∈ [0, ∞) and let in a symmetric equilibrium µ be the level of income (which depends on r)
such that a bidder with income µ is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. If the bidder with income µ chooses not to bid (that is, he selects {No}) then he spends his entire income on good x and gets utility wµ. If he bids, he must bid the lowest admissible amount which is r. If he bids r then the probability that he wins in a symmetric equilibrium is F n−1 (µ), the probability that all other incomes are less than µ. His expected payoff is then
The above must be equal to wµ, since he is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. That is, we have
We can now easily compute that if r ∈ [0, v (β)] then
where µ is s.t.
Expected revenues with a reserve price
We now deduce the expected revenue going to the seller for each of the three auctions with a reserve price r. In a first price auction the expected payment of a bidder with income m ≥ qr−s q−w is 
In an all-pay auction the expected payment of a bidder with income m ≥ µ is just b AP (m).
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The expected revenues are as follows.
First-Price Auction:
Second-Price Auction:
All-Pay Auction:
We now provide our next set of main results that compare expected revenues.
Comment Like the case of no reserve price, in both second price and first price auctions, one can show that with reserve price r, the bidders' equilibrium bids would be exactly the same in our model as they would have in the benchmark model. Since in the symmetric benchmark model, for any reserve price the expected revenue is same in first price and second price auctions, the same holds true for our model as well. However, for any arbitrary r, we cannot compare expected revenue in all-pay auction and first-price auction. We show this in terms of an example.
Example 5 We take the same specification as example 4. That is we have the following. 
The expected revenues in first-price and all-pay auctions are as follows.
We plot R I (r) (bold line) and R AR (r) (dash line) below. Optimal reserve price We next compute the optimal reserve price in each of these auctions.
Let
and r * (AP A) = arg max
Note that proposition 3 clearly shows that the optimum reserve price will be the same in first-price and second price auction. That is, r * (F P A) = r * (SP A). We now provide our next main result on optimal reserve prices. It may also be noted that non-decreasing hazard rate is a very standard assumption in the benchmark auction model. Note that higher is α (the minimum possible income) or higher is s = u (0, 1) the lower is q−w (q−w)α+s and the inequality f (α) ≥ q−w (q−w)α+s is more likely to be satisfied. As such, we can intuitively say that either if all incomes are very high or if u (0, 1) is very high then the optimal reserve price will always be zero.
It may be noted that in the benchmark model the revenue maximising reserve price is generally positive and above v (the minimum possible valuation, which is v (α) in our model). As noted in the introduction, recently Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010) analyse reserve prices when bidders are asymmetric. They provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal reserve price is zero.
In a symmetric setting their conditions would be the following (see the discussion after proposition 2 in our paper for the notations).
Although our model is different, we show that our sufficient conditions are weaker than Gunay,
Meng and Nagelberg (2010). Note that
is non-decreasing. Since we need the hazard rate to be non-decreasing and f (α) ≥ q−w (q−w)α+s our sufficient conditions are weaker than the sufficient conditions required in Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010).
Symmetric Equilibria with low enough incomes
The previous section dealt with risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes. We now turn our attention to the case where bidders' incomes are low enough (i.e. β < k) and there is no reserve price. In this section we allow for general preferences (that include risk neutrality).
Since β < k we have m i < k for all i and from (1) we know that v (m i ) = m i for all i. We also know from proposition 1 that in a second price auction the symmetric equilibrium will be given by b II (m i ) = m i . We now analyse symmetric equilibria in first-price and all-pay auctions and show that under some restrictions all bidders bidding their valuations is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium even for these auctions. 24
Let us denote the marginal utility of x by the following.
this is an abuse of notation).
We now proceed to our next two results.
Proposition 5 If the reverse hazard rate
is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a first price auction.
and
then b AP (m i ) = m i is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an all-pay auction.
The expected revenues in this case are as follows.
All-Pay :
We now provide the revenue ranking result for the case when incomes are low enough.
Proposition 7
If all the conditions of propositions 5 and 6 hold then R AP > R I > R II .
Comment As noted in the introduction, in Che and Gale (1998) an individual's income may be strictly less than his valuation for the auction good. Che and Gale (1998) show that it is possible to have a symmetric equilibrium in a first price auction where bids are equal to incomes and the expected revenue in first price auctions will be strictly higher than the expected revenue in second price auctions. In our model, when incomes are low enough, valuations are exactly equal to incomes (see (1)). We have shown that bidders bid their valuations in a symmetric equilibrium first price auctions (proposition 5). This, together with the fact that R I > R II (proposition 7) is somewhat close in spirit to Che and Gale (1998).
We have also shown that even for all pay auctions it is possible to have a symmetric equilibrium where bidders bid their valuations (proposition 6). This result is surprising and has not been demonstrated before. In a nutshell, when bidders' incomes are low enough, revenue equivalence fails to hold and all-pay auction fetches the highest expected revenue.
We now provide three simple examples to illustrate propositions 5-7. The purpose is twofold. and R AP = 1.
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Conclusion
In this paper we had a re-look at the basic auction model. Unlike the benchmark model we take a novel approach and consider a more general class of utility functions and assume that all individuals have the same utility functions but have different incomes. We treat incomes as types.
Each individual's income is private information and this implies that valuations (that are functions of income) are also private information. We have shown that in two good world where one good is available in a store at a fixed price and the other good is sold in an auction, many results of the benchmark model do not hold. While Vickrey's (1961) result on second price auction is very robust, revenue equivalence breaks down even with risk-neutral bidders and high enough incomes.
We propose the following for possible future research.
1. In this paper for first-price and all-pay auctions we have dealt with either high enough incomes (i.e. α ≥ k) or low enough incomes (i.e. β < k). We have not analysed the case when α < k < β. Derivation of equilibrium in first price auctions and all-pay auctions, effects of reserve price and revenue ranking results when α < k < β should be an interesting (and challenging) future course of research.
2. It would be interesting to compute the expected revenue maximising optimal mechanisms in our model.
3. It would also be interesting to explore the possible equilibria and revenue ranking when bidders are risk averse with high enough incomes.
We believe there is ample scope for further research into this area. 
. If b 1 = z bidder 1 wins with probability ρ and gets 
We also have
Using (8) and (9) in (7) we get
This means
Now from section 4.1.3 we have
Note that q > w and
Hence for all m ∈ [α, β)
Using above in (13) we get
It may be noted that
Using (15) in (14) we get
(using 8 and 10).
Therefore R AP > R I = R II .¥
Proof of Proposition 3
When r ∈ [0, v (α)) then it makes no difference to the equilibrium outcome in both first-price auction and second-price auction. That is, r ∈ [0, v (α)) is equivalent to r = 0. With r = 0 we know that R I = R II (from proposition 2). This implies that R I (r) = R II (r) for all r ∈ [0, v (α)). We now show that the same is true for r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)].
From section 4.2.4 we know that for all
We also know (from section 4.
Since we have just shown that P I (m, r) = P II (m, r) for all r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)], we get that R I (r) =
. At the begining of the proof we have already shown that R I (r) = R II (r) for all r ∈ [0, v (α)).¥ Proof of Proposition 4 First note that for any r ∈ [0, v (α)) , R I (r) is same as R I (0). And so
For r ∈ (v (β) , ∞) we have R I (r) = 0 (since no bidder will make any bid for such a r).
And ∂ ∂r
Using (18) and (19) in (17) we get that
Using (21) and (22) we get that for r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)]
Using ( 
where µ is s.t. Note that since since q > w and µ ≤ m we get
Using the above in (27) we have Then his expected payoff is All-Pay :
First note that F 1 (z) = F n (z) and F 2 (z) = F n (z) + nF n−1 (z) (1 − F (z)). Since F 1 (z) < F 2 (z)
for all z ∈ (α, β) we have R I > R II .
Also note that Hence we have R AP > R I > R II .¥
